SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey Supreme Court cases of interest to practitioners. In so
doing, we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some
of the more interesting changes in signicant areas of practice.
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CRIMINAL LAW-PRISON DISCIPLINE-PRISON OFFIcIALs ARE NOT
REQUIRED TO VIDEOTAPE OR TAPE-RECORD DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

TO

ENSURE

A

PRISONER'S

PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS

RIGHTS-McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 NJ. 188, 652 A.2d 700

(1995).
Gallimore McDonald, an inmate at East Jersey State Prison,
was accused of assaulting another inmate with a weapon during an
altercation at a visit hall. 139 N.J. 188, 192, 652 A.2d 700, 702. Corrections Lt. Robert Connell allegedly observed McDonald swinging
a chair, and charged him with assault with a weapon. McDonald,
aided by a counsel substitute at the disciplinary hearing, denied
committing the assault. Instead, McDonald alleged that he was the
victim of an assault.
The disciplinary committee's one-page report indicated that
McDonald denied the charges. Id. at 193, 652 A.2d at 702. The
report also stated that McDonald declined the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses. In contrast, McDonald claimed that he asked
the investigating officer to question several witnesses, but the officer told him that the witnesses declined to comment. Superintendent Steven Pinchak stated that McDonald identified only one
witness.
The hearing officer returned a guilty verdict based on Lt. Connell's report, and imposed sanctions. Id. On appeal, McDonald
alleged that the investigating and hearing officers failed to comply
with the Department of Corrections (DOC) regulations by denying
his request to cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 191, 652 A.2d at 702.
In addition, McDonald asserted that disciplinary hearings should
be tape-recorded or videotaped to facilitate judicial review. Id. at
201, 652 A.2d at 706. McDonald's appeals were denied by the
prison's assistant superintendent and the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division. Id. at 193, 652 A.2d at 702.
The NewJersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether the disciplinary hearing violated procedural due
process and New Jersey's fairness and rightness standard. Id. at
191, 193, 652 A.2d 702 (citation omitted). The court held that,
strictly followed, the State's standards for conducting disciplinary
hearings ensured procedural due process and therefore, tape-recording or videotaping the hearings was not required. Id. at 192,
652 A.2d at 702.
Writing for the court, Justice Garibaldi first established that
New Jersey's rules and regulations ensuring a prisoner's due pro1632
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cess rights at a disciplinary hearing are broader than those required by the federal constitutional minimum. Id. at 194-96, 652
A.2d at 702-04. The majority noted that the Constitution requires
that an inmate facing a disciplinary hearing receive: (a) a written
notice of the allegation; (b) a written statement giving the reasons
for the action and the evidence upon which the prosecution relied;
(c) a right to call witnesses and offer documentary evidence, when
these rights are not unduly hazardous to the prison safety or correctional goals; and (d) a right to aid from a counsel substitute if
the prisoner is illiterate or if the matters are too complicated for
the inmate to organize an adequate defense. Id. at 194-95, 652
A.2d at 703 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974)).
The majority commented that pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, inmates are entitled to certain protections, but an inmate's
constitutional rights are limited to the extent required to meet the
institutional demands and objectives of the prisons. Id. at 194, 652
A.2d at 703 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556). Thejustice asserted that
quick and certain punishment is a tool which prison administrators
implement to preserve order and prevent future misconduct. Id.
The majority noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court similarly balanced prisoners' due process rights against the objectives
and needs of prisons in Avant v. Clifford. Id. (citing Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 561 (1975)). Justice Garibaldi stressed that the
Avant court extended state due process protections beyond the federal guarantees by allowing an informal hearing, but required that
the procedures establish the factual accuracy of the allegations. Id.
at 195, 652 A.2d at 703 (citation omitted). The court then rejected
McDonald's contention that hearing officers routinely rubber
stamp the charges made by prison officials. Id. at 196, 652 A.2d at
704. The justice pointed to several facts that discredited McDonald's assertion: (1) statistics showing that hearing officers found
inmates guilty at only 70% of the hearings; (2) the number of
other people involved in the pre-hearing process, acting as a check
on the hearing officer; and (3) hearing officers being employed by
the DOC, not individual prisons, have no allegiance to prison officials. Id. at 195-96, 652 A.2d at 703-04.
The court next addressed McDonald's contention that his due
process rights were violated because the hearing officer refused
McDonald his right to call witnesses, present evidence, confront
witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 196, 652 A.2d at 704.
The majority proffered that New Jersey law requires that inmates
be permitted to call witnesses and introduce documentary evi-
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dence, so long as these rights are not unduly hazardous to the
safety or goals of the prison. Id. (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(a)
(West 19xx)). Justice Garibaldi noted that this standard mirrors
the federal standard expressed in the Wolff case. Id. The justice
added that New Jersey law allows the hearing officer to decline to
call witnesses, but requires that the reasons for such a refusal be
listed on the adjudication form. Id. (citing N.J.A.C 10A:4-9.13(a)).
Noting that the federal constitutional requirements do not mandate the recording of reasons for refusal, the majority recognized
that NewJersey requires stricter standards for ensuring due process
rights of prisoners. Id. at 196-97, 652 A.2d at 704.
The court propounded that New Jersey permits an inmate the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses if the inmate
so requests. Id. at 197, 652 A.2d at 704 (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:49.14(a) (West 19xx)). The majority indicated that a hearing officer can refuse such a request if it is deemed unnecessary for adequate demonstration of the evidence or if it is hazardous to the
safety or goals of the prison. Id. (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14(a) &
(b) and Avant, 67 N.J. at 530-32). The court observed that under
the federal constitution, the decision of whether to allow confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is left entirely to the discretion of prison officials. Id. at 197-98, 652 A.2d at 704-05 (citing
Wolff 418 U.S. at 568). Acknowledging that the Avant holding and
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14 exceed the federal standards, Justice Garibaldi
concluded that the court need not expand an inmate's right to
cross-examination and confrontation to ensure procedural due
process. Id. at 198-99, 652 A.2d at 705 (citations omitted).
The court admitted the need for an improvement in the DOC
record-keeping so that reviewing bodies have a adequate record of
the disciplinary hearings. Id. at 199, 652 A.2d at 705. The majority
suggested a more detailed adjudication form that would require
the inmate or counsel substitute to sign the form agreeing to the
hearing officer's assessment of the disciplinary hearing. Id. Justice
Garibaldi also suggested that the DOC allow inmates to submit
written applications for witnesses and attach those requests to the
record. Id. The majority asserted that this improved record-keeping would have prevented the issues set forth by McDonald. Id.
McDonald contended that the hearing officer denied his plea
to call and confront witnesses, while the assistant superintendent
denied knowing that McDonald requested any witnesses except for
one inmate. Id. at 200, 652 A.2d at 706. Considering that McDonald's adjudication form merely stated that McDonald had not re-
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quested cross-examination, the court declared the record
insufficient to resolve the discrepancy. Id. Justice Garibaldi thus
remanded the case to the DOC to enhance the record, and to ascertain whether McDonald actually requested his right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 201, 652 A.2d at 706. The justice asserted that if the DOC determines that McDonald did not
make the request, the evidence presently in the record sufficiently
establishes his guilt. Id. Justice Garibaldi furthered, however, that
if the DOC concludes that McDonald did make the request, then
he is entitled to a rehearing at which to call those witnesses. Id.
The majority disagreed with the dissent's contention that remanding the case to the original hearing officer would cause a substantial likelihood of prejudice. Id. at 200, 652 A.2d at 706. The
court explained that McDonald only contended that the investigating officer, rather than the hearing officer, failed to question the
requested witnesses. Id. Justice Garibaldi, however, directed the
superintendent to determine whether a new hearing officer must
be appointed to prevent prejudice at the remanded hearing. Id. at
201, 652 A.2d at 706.
Lastly, the court refuted McDonald's assertion that disciplinary hearings should be tape-recorded or videotaped to create a
more thorough record for judicial review. Id. The majority emphasized that, similar to the United States Supreme Court, neither
the current DOC regulations nor the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, have interpreted the state constitution to require the verbatim recording of disciplinary hearings. Id. (citations
omitted). Justice Garibaldi maintained that the New Jersey
Supreme Court could only require the DOC to record disciplinary
hearings if failure to record the hearings violated New Jersey's constitutional concepts of fairness and rightness. Id. (citing Avant, 67
NJ. at 527). The justice determined that while tape-recording or
videotaping the hearing would create an accurate account of the
hearing, the process would be costly, burdensome, and create delays. Id. Justice Garibaldi further criticized the procedure by noting that such recordings would not include pre-hearing procedures
that are recognized on the adjudication forms. Id. at 202, 652 A.2d
at 706-07. The majority discerned that the amended adjudication
forms would serve many of the same purposes of tape-recording
without the costs and delays. Id., 652 A.2d at 707. Thus, the court
refused to require the tape-recording or videotaping of disciplinary
hearings because the failure to record does not violate procedural
due process or New Jersey's fairness and rightness standard. Id.
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Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed the
procedural protections provided to inmates by the DOC's regulations and acknowledged in the Avant case. Id. The court asserted
that an inmate's due process rights receive adequate protection
from the amended adjudication form, so long as the hearing officers thoroughly complete it. Id. Thus, the court held that the
tape-recording or videotaping of disciplinary hearings is not required to ensure the due process rights of inmates. Id.
Justice Stein wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part to the majority's opinion. Id. at 203, 652 A.2d at
707 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice agreed with the court's decision to remand the case to the
DOC, but asserted that the court erred by limiting the remand to a
finding of whether McDonald actually requested his right to confront or cross-examine witnesses. Id. Justice Stein contended that
the initial determination should be vacated, and McDonald should
be granted a new hearing before a different hearing officer. Id.
The justice also disagreed with the majority's appraisal of the due
process ramifications implicit in the tape-recording issue. Id.
The dissent opined that the majority's remand to the DOC was
defective in two ways. Id. at 206, 652 A.2d at 709 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). First, Justice Stein stated that
the court's remand violates the due process and the DOC requirement of an unbiased hearing tribunal. Id. The justice explained
that the DOC regulations and basic due process standards mandate
disciplinary hearings be decided by an impartial hearing officer.
Id. (citing N.J.A.C. 1OA:4-11.6(b)). The justice declared that a remand to the original hearing officer would violate McDonald's due
process rights. Id. Reminding that no witness except McDonald
testified at the first hearing, Justice Stein reasoned that only the
original hearing officer could refute McDonald's assertions or corroborate his own written statement on the adjudication report. Id.
Therefore, Justice Stein concluded that the original hearing officer
would be unable to conduct an impartial rehearing. Id. at 207, 652
A.2d at 709 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Second, the justice furthered, the court mistakenly assumed
that a new hearing, even before a different hearing officer, would
solve the conflict over what happened at the original disciplinary
hearing. Id. The dissent recounted that the core of McDonald's
allegation was that hearing officers routinely deny inmate requests
to call or question witnesses, and inevitably fail to register on the
adjudication report that these requests were made. Id. Emphasiz-
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ing that the DOC maintains no record of the hearings other than
the adjudication report drafted by the hearing officer, Justice Stein
articulated that finding a reliable resolution upon remand is highly
improbable. Id. The justice predicted that the original hearing officer would be unable to accurately recall the events of the first
hearing after two and a half years. Id. Thus, Justice Stein proffered, the second hearing officer would be left to determine
whether the adjudication report or McDonald's recollection was
more reliable. Id. The justice posited that under these circumstances, an inmate had little or no possibility of success. Id. at 20708, 652 A.2d at 709 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Therefore, Justice Stein concluded that the appropriate resolution of McDonald's appeal was to vacate the decision of the
original hearing officer and remand the entire matter to be retried
before a different hearing officer. Id. at 208, 652 A.2d at 709
(Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Finally, Justice Stein disagreed with the court's finding that
the DOC is not required to tape-record or videotape disciplinary
hearings because the record does not indicate the extent to which
an inmate is denied effective appellate review. Id. at 211, 652 A.2d
at 711 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
justice reasoned that the majority's decision on the issue was unnecessary to determine McDonald's appeal, and subsequently the
majority did not sufficiently confront the relevant concerns. Id.
The dissent articulated that the court should weigh the advantages
to appellate review that a verbatim transcript would afford against
the actual costs of tape-recording the hearings. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly refused to mandate
the recording of disciplinary hearings. While recorded hearings
would create a more extensive record helpful to appellate review,
the process would create additional costs and delays. There is no
need to burden the system with these costs to ensure due process
because the amended adjudication report proposed by the court
obviates the need for such a comprehensive record of the hearings.
By requiring the inmate's signature on this amended form, the
DOC will be ensuring the due process rights of all inmates because
the requirement allows an inmate immediate recourse for alleged
due process violations. If an inmate refuses to sign, the DOC can
immediately investigate the inmate's allegations while the recollections of the involved parties'are current. This would solve the
problem faced by the new hearing officer in McDonald's remanded hearing.
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The recording of hearings could only supplement the adjudication forms because pre-hearing events can only be entered on
the forms. Thus, the initial recording costs would be added to current DOC costs. Also, mandatory recording will inevitably lead to
future litigation if problems arise with the recording or storage of
tapes. Possible problems include inaudible statements made during the hearing, faulty or subsequently damaged tapes, and deterioration of tapes over time. Under these circumstances, courts
would be forced to redetermine whether the incompletely-recorded hearings afforded the inmate his right to due process. It is
important to recall that an inmate's constitutional privileges are
restricted to the extent required to meet the objectives and needs
of prisons. See id. at 194, 652 A.2d at 703. Clearly, funds and manpower can be better utilized to meet the objectives and needs of
prisons because the inmates' due process rights are already ensured by the amended adjudication form. Tape-recording or videotaping would thus be an extravagant expense, and would provide
an incentive for frivolous appeals by inmates who have nothing to
lose in terms of time or legal expenses by instituting such actions.
Ben Montenegro
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139 N.J. 236, 652 A.2d 1209 (1995).
In State v. Nwobu, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
two appeals, both of which involved the admission of criminal defendants into Pretrial Intervention programs (PTI). 139 N.J. at
240, 652 A.2d at 1211. PTI is an alternative to the prosecution of
criminal defendants that provides early rehabilitative services to
certain classes of defendants in an effort to deter future criminal
conduct.
The first case involved Daniel Nwobu, who in 1991 had been
charged by a Bergen County Grand Jury with second-degree theft
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by deception. Id. at 241, 652 A.2d at 1211. Specifically, the indictment charged Nwobu with stealing and forging checks from his
employer. After arraignment, Nwobu applied for admission to the
Bergen County PTI. His admission was denied. The PTI director
offered four reasons for the denial: 1) Nwobu had failed to provide compelling reasons to surmount the statutory presumption
against admitting second-degree offenders into PTI; 2) Nwobu's
application did not have the prosecutor's support; 3) Nwobu's conduct constituted continuous anti-social behavior; and 4) admission
of Nwobu into PTI would provide neither a sufficient sanction nor
deterrent.
Nwobu appealed the denial of admission to the Law Division.
The prosecutor wrote a letter to the defendant explaining that the
Bergen County Prosecutor opposed Nwobu's admission for the
same reasons as the PTI director. The trial court ordered the Bergen County Prosecutor to reevaluate and reconsider Nwobu's application. The prosecutor responded that the State's stance
remained unaltered. Consequently, the court ordered Nwobu's
admission into PTI. Id.
The trial court held that the denial of the defendant's application constituted patent and gross abuse of discretion. Id. at 242,
652 A.2d at 1211. The trial court reasoned that the prosecutor
could not justify the denial to PTI simply by referring to the PTI
director's reasons, and thus stayed further prosecution. Id. at 242,
652 A.2d at 1211. The State appealed to the NewJersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, but failed to seek a stay of Nwobu's entry
into PTI. Id. Nwobu entered PTI and completed his term, prior to
an appellate decision six months later. Id. at 242, 652 A.2d at 1212.
Nwobu subsequently sought dismissal of the appeal, contending
that it was fundamentally unfair, moot, and a violation of doublejeopardy. Id.
The appellate division denied the defendant's motion. Id. On
the merits, the appellate court held that as long as the PTI director's reasons for denial of the defendant's application were valid,
the prosecutor could properly rely on those reasons. Id. The defendant subsequently appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Id.
The second case involved three young men, James Callender,
Bryan Harris, and James Overby, who in 1990 were at an East Orange park, waiting to play basketball and drinking beer. Id. None
of the three had any prior criminal histories. While waiting, one of
the three, exactly which one remained undetermined, threw a
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"blockbuster" firecracker having the explosive force of a one-quarter stick of dynamite. Id. at 242-43, 652 A.2d at 1212. The firecracker bounced off a tree limb and exploded near the three-yearold son of an off-duty New Jersey State Trooper. Id. The child was
not injured, but an angry crowd of bystanders attacked the three
men, and Overby lost his right eye in the ensuing melee. Id. at 243,
652 A.2d at 1212. When police arrived, they arrested Callender,
Harris, and Overby and discovered fireworks in Overby's car.
The three defendants were charged by an Essex County Grand
Jury with second-degree possession of a destructive device for an
unlawful purpose, third-degree arson, and third-degree possession
of a prohibited destructive device. Before the defendants applied
for PTI, the trial court asked the prosecutor to make a preliminary
determination as to the option of PTI. The prosecutor declined to
support defendants' admission into PTI, citing five reasons: 1) applications to PTI should generally be rejected in the case of violent
offenses; 2) a statutory presumption against second-degree offenders normally requires rejection of such an application; 3) society's
interest in prosecuting defendants outweighed the defendants' interests in PTI; 4) the defendants had failed to offer evidence that
their backgrounds or characters overcame the presumption against
the seriousness of the offenses; and 5) the adverse impact of granting PTI to only one or two co-defendants required that they all be
denied. Id. at 24344, 652 A.2d at 1212.
The defendants appealed the rejection and supplied personal
information in an attempt to overcome the presumptions against
admission to PTI. Id. at 244, 652 A.2d at 1213. Defendant Callender graduated from prep-school and then attended college for
a brief period of time, was employed, and had volunteered for
community activities. Defendant Harris had served in the Persian
Gulf War, received an honorable discharge, and was married. Defendant Overby, while unemployed and unmarried, provided financial support for two children. None of the three had any
criminal history.
The trial court ordered the prosecutor to reevaluate and reconsider the defendants' applications. The prosecutor responded
to each defendant individually, by letter, rejecting each of the
three. Subsequently, in 1992 the trial court ordered all three defendants into PTI, reasoning that the prosecutor's rejection of the
applications constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 244-45, 652
A.2d at 1213. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the refusal to consent to PTI in this case consti-
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tuted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 245, 652 A.2d at 1213. The
State motioned for a stay of the appellate division's decision pending leave to appeal and simultaneously motioned for leave to appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. Each motion was
granted. Id.
A unanimous supreme court held that in the case of Nwobu,
the prosecutor's decision to refuse defendant's admission into PTI
could have been reasonably made under the relevant facts and setting. Id. at 254, 652 A.2d at 1218. In the case of Callender, Harris,
and Overby, the court held that the prosecutor's denial of defendants' PTI applications did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id.
at 256-57, 652 A.2d at 1219. Finally, the court held that doublejeopardy does not prevent the prosecution of defendant Nwobu
because he lacked a reasonable expectation in the finality of his
case. Id. at 257, 652 A.2d at 1219.
Justice O'Hern, writing for the court, began the court's analysis by recounting the statutory history and purpose of PTI. See id. at
245, 652 A.2d at 1213. The justice noted that current practice requires the consent of the prosecutor before defendants may be admitted into PTI. Id. The court stated that the standard of review
for PTI admission decisions is firmly established. Id. at 246, 652
A.2d at 1213-14 (citations omitted). The court referred to an appellate division case that enumerated the enhanced or extra deference standard of review in such cases. Id. (quoting State v. Kraft,
265 N.J. Super. 106, 111-12, 625 A.2d 579, 581-82 (App. Div. 1993).
Further, the court delineated the three-part standard for patent
and gross abuse of discretion. Id. at 247, 652 A.2d at 1214 (citation
omitted). Specifically, the justice explained that prosecutorial
abuse of discretion requires a showing by the defendant that the
prosecutor failed to consider all of the relevant factors, that the
decision relied on inappropriate or irrelevant factors, or that the
decision resulted from clear error in prosecutorial judgment. Id.
(citations omitted).
The court next addressed the Guidelines for Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey (the Guidelines), promulgated by
the New Jersey Supreme Court to provide criteria for PTI admissions decisions. Id. (citations omitted). Justice O'Hern identified
four of the Guidelines, numbers one, two, three, and eight, as relevant to the cases at issue. Id. Guideline one, the court explained,
establishes several purposes underlying PTI, including early rehabilitation of criminal defendants, deterrence of future crimes, and
public policies regarding victimless crimes and overburdened crim-
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inal courts. Id. The court next addressed Guideline two, which
provides that any criminal defendant is eligible for PTI, and that
defendants may supplement the application with facts in support
of admission. Id. at 247-48, 652 A.2d at 1215. Guideline three, the
court articulated,; lists several factors relevant to admissions decisions, including the nature of the crime. Id. at 248, 652 A.2d at
1215. Thejustice noted that PTI applications should be rejected in
the cases of violent crimes, second-degree crimes, and cases in
which the impact on co-defendants may be prejudicial. Id. Finally,
the court considered Guideline eight, which establishes certain
procedural requirements on the PTI application process. Id.
The court reiterated the importance of an accompanying
statement of reasons with any PTI decision. Id. at 248-49, 652 A.2d
at 1215. The justice noted that the statement must not simply repeat the guidelines, but must note specific factors and avoid vagueness. Id. at 249, 652 A.2d at 1215. Finally, the court proffered that
reviewing courts must presume, absent contrary evidence, that the
prosecutor indeed considered all the relevant factors and circumstances before making a decision regarding admission into PTI. Id.
(citations omitted). Although the presumption is rebuttable, the
court acknowledged that such a requirement often renders reversals very difficult. Id.
Turning to Nwobu, the court admitted that the facts of the
case created a difficult situation for all parties involved. Id. at 24950, 652 A.2d at 1215-16. The justice noted that the complexity of
Nwobu's offense resulted in poor handling of the PTI application
process. Id. Nevertheless, the court determined that the prosecutor could adopt the reasoning of the PTI director in evaluating the
defendant's PTI application. Id. at 250, 652 A.2d at 1216. Justice
O'Hern explained that the prosecutor's reliance upon the PTI director's reasons did not undermine the purposes behind the accompanying statement of reasons when a PTI decision is made. Id.
Further, the court stated that the weight of the proofs against the
accused was not dispositive of the PTI application process. Id. at
251, 652 A.2d at 1216 (citation omitted). Further, the court noted
that the involvement of the prosecutor and the PTI director need
not be equal in each application evaluation. Id. (citation omitted).
The court concluded that, until the rules are refined to require
discrete reasoning, the prosecutor may properly rely upon the PTI
director's statement of reasons. Id.
The court next evaluated the adequacy of the statement of reasons. See id. Thejustice proclaimed that the statement satisfied the
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requirements that it specify certain factors regarding the situation
without being vague. Id. The court stated that the most important
factor was that Nwobu had been charged with a second-degree offense. Id. at 252, 652 A.2d at 1217. The court agreed that the defendant had failed to adequately establish compelling reasons to
overcome the presumption against second-degree defendants. Id.
at 252-53, 652 A.2d at 1217.
The court next determined that none of the three tests showing an abuse of discretion had been met. Id. at 253, 652 A.2d at
1217. The court found that all of the relevant factors had been
considered by the PTI director or the prosecutor. Id. Because the
defendant did not rely upon the second prong-that the prosecutor grounded the evaluation on irrelevant factors-the court did
not consider the test. Id. The court did, however, consider the
defendant's claim that the prosecutor's rejection constituted a
clear error in judgment. Id. Justice O'Hern explained that a clear
error must be one which shocks judicial conscience by its unreasonableness. Id. at 253-54, 652 A.2d at 1217-18 (quotation omitted). The court determined that the prosecutor did not diverge
from the Guidelines that set out the objectives of PTI. Id. at 254,
652 A.2d at 1218. Thus, the court affirmed the appellate decision,
holding that the prosecutor properly and reasonably rejected
Nwobu's PTI application. Id.
Having disposed of the first issue in Nwobu's appeal, Justice
O'Hern turned to Callender, Harris, and Overby. See id. The court
first reasoned that simply because the prosecutor rejected all three
defendants' PTI applications, it did not necessarily follow that the
prosecutor failed to consider each defendant individually. Id. at
255, 652 A.2d at 1218. The court noted that the record supported
such a finding, relying on the letters written by the prosecutor to
each defendant explaining that the positive factors in each of their
backgrounds did not outweigh the necessity of prosecution. Id.
Further, the justice agreed that the potential hazards of offering
only one defendant PTI justified the denial to all three. Id.
The justice next addressed the concern that the prosecutor's
decision was influenced by the involvement of an off-duty officer
and his child. Id., 652 A.2d at 1219. Justice O'Hern articulated
that if such were the case, the court would not hesitate to take corrective action, but in this case the record did not support any such
finding. Id. at 256, 652 A.2d at 1219.
The court concluded by considering whether the prosecutor
had made a clear error in judgment. Id. The justice emphasized
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the severity of the offense, discounting the defendants' claims that
they intended no harm. Id. The court reasoned that denying PTI
to individuals who throw explosives into crowds reflects a legitimate purpose of the Guidelines. Id. The court also repeated the
fact that second-degree offenders must overcome a presumption
against PTI. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the prosecutor
had made no clear error in judgment. Id.
Consequendy, the court reversed the appellate decision, holding that because the prosecutor considered all relevant factors,
without relying on inappropriate or irrelevant factors, and had
made no clear error in judgment, the denial of the defendants'
PTI applications did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at
256-57, 652 A.2d at 1219.
After concluding the examination of prosecutorial discretion,
the court addressed Nwobu's contention that prosecution after his
completion of PTI violated double jeopardy. See id. at 257, 652
A.2d at 1219. The court began by noting that PTI resembles probation, a recognized criminal sanction. Id. Nevertheless, the court
declined to determine whether PTI constitutes criminal punishment. Id.
The court relied on the fact that Nwobu could not reasonably
expect the trial court's order admitting him into PTI to constitute
a final disposition. Id. The justice noted that the expectation of
finality forms the foundation for double-jeopardy. Id. (quotation
omitted). The court reasoned that in this case the defendant knew
that the order admitting him into PTI was contested and thus provisional. Id. at 258, 652 A.2d at 1220. The court expounded that
any expectation of finality on the defendant's part was unreasonable. Id. at 259, 652 A.2d at 1221. Further, the court explained that
the same reasoning applied to the question of fundamental fairness. Id. The justice proffered that the defendant knew that the
State intended to prosecute, and the fact that the appeals process
took the course it did is not in itself unfair. Id. The court acknowledged the unusual circumstances of this case, and recommended
that the Criminal Practice Committee review the applicable rule to
cure potentially similar problems. Id. at 258, 652 A.2d at 1220. Ultimately, the court affirmed the appellate division, holding that the
prosecution of Nwobu after he had completed PTI did not violate
double jeopardy. Id. at 259, 652 A.2d at 1221.
Justice O'Hern concluded the court's opinion by noting that
the most important factor in both cases was that the defendants
had been charged with second-degree offenses. Id. The justice ac-
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knowledged that both cases were troublesome: Nwobu's because
of the complexity of the offense; and Callender, et al. because of
their admirable backgrounds. Id. The court lamented the difficulty of balancing the dual functions of law: retribution and rehabilitation. Id. at 260, 652 A.2d at 1221. The court reflected that
the decision belongs not to the court, but to the prosecutor, who
may reconsider the decisions to deny PTI. Id. (quotation omitted).
Justice O'Hern perceptively identified the difficulties with
these cases. None of the defendants were necessarily malicious,
evil men. Nevertheless, the alleged offenses involved have been
properly classified as serious crimes that could potentially harm
either businesses or people. Society's demand that criminals be
put away often strikes a resonant chord in today's violent and depraved world. Unfortunately, crime doesn't stop at destroying the
innocent. In our rapidly deteriorating society, rehabilitation may
be at least as important as excision.
PTI programs serve an important function, healing and benefitting those members of society who may have gone astray, and
restoring them before they must be removed by incarceration. To
that end, PTI programs deserve every benefit of the doubt, and
qualified offenders should be given every chance. The retributive
function of law, however, must not be abandoned. The courts are
best suited to determining the criteria and process necessary to balance law's dual purposes. Nevertheless, as Justice O'Hern posited,
the courts are in no position to substitute their judgment for the
prosecutor's, at least on an individual basis. Id. The tough decisions, like those in State v. Nwobu, must be made at the individual
level, and the prosecutor is probably best suited to make an informed decision. As the court indicated, prosecutors may change
their minds depending upon the circumstances. The judiciary
must restrict itself to solving the unusual case, such as Nwobu's
double jeopardy claim. Only when the balance must be strengthened-when the law punishes arbitrarily or without compassionshould the court reassert its power.
ChristopherE. Torkelson
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A
TORTS-NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMANT WHOSE INTIMATE FAMILY MEMBER Is INJURED DUE TO
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MAY RECOVER ON AN INDIRECT CLAIM

FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IF THE
CLAIMANT WITNESSES THE MALPRACTICE, IMMEDIATELY CONNECTS THE MALPRACTICE TO THE INJURY, AND THEREBY SUFFERS

DISTRESs-Gendek v. Poblete, 139 N.J. 291,
654 A.2d 970 (1995).
SEVERE EMOTIONAL

At 7:28 a.m. on September 27, 1987, the plaintiff, Jean
Gendek, gave birth to Gregory, who appeared to be in good health.
Id. at 293, 654 A.2d at 971. Later that morning, a nurse at the
Neonatal Nursery noticed that Gregory's forehead was swollen and
that his complexion seemed dusky. According to medical notations, Gregory's color turned dusky several times between his birth
and 12:00 p.m., but his normal color was restored after stimulation.
Shortly after noon that day, another nurse observed that Gregory
had no sucking reflex. Gregory spent most of that afternoon and
evening with his mother, who reported that Gregory's hands and
feet were purple. Id. at 294, 654 A.2d at 971. Having expressed
alarm to an attending nurse, Mrs. Gendek was assured that her son
was fine. At approximately 8:00 a.m. the following day, several
nurses began emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation when they
discovered that Gregory was not breathing. At this time, Mrs.
Gendek was informed of Gregory's medical difficulty, told to summon her priest, and rushed to the nursery where she witnessed
medical personnel crowding around her baby. Id., 654 A.2d at 972.
Although the doctors eventually restored Gregory's heartbeat, Mr.
and Mrs. Gendek observed their baby experience severe convulsions and undergo a battery of treatments, examinations, and tests.
Although Gregory survived, he remained in a persistent vegetative
state, relying on tubular ventilatory and nutritive care. Id. at 295,
654 A.2d at 972. On November 10, 1987, after forty-five days, the
Gendeks decided to end the artificial care that was supporting
their infant son, and Gregory died.
Nearly five years after their son's death, the Gendeks were diagnosed with "uncomplicated bereavement," a condition characterized by intense feelings of guilt resulting in depression, selfreproach, and concentration impairment. Consequently, the
Gendeks brought suit against Mercer Medical Center and the medical personnel who were allegedly chargeable for causing Gregory's
death. Id.
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In their complaint, the Gendeks alleged medical malpractice,
administrative negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress in connection with their child's death. Id. at 293, 654 A.2d
at 971. Defendant Mercer Medical Center filed a motion for partial summaryjudgment, seeking dismissal of the Gendeks' claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 295, 654 A.2d at
972. The court granted the hospital's motion, whereupon the
Gendeks moved unsuccessfully for leave to appeal. Id. at 295-96,
654 A.2d at 972. On reconsideration, the trial court reaffirmed its
prior decision. Id. at 296, 654 A.2d at 972. Again, plaintiffs motioned for leave to appeal, which the appellate division granted.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
Gendeks' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
(citing Gendek v. Poblete, 269 N.J. Super. 599, 636 A.2d 113 (1994)).
Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
Gendeks' motion for leave to appeal the lower court's dismissal of
their claim. Id. at 293, 654 A.2d at 971.
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, began the court's
analysis by examining prior case law to determine when and under
what circumstances the court has recognized a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 298, 654 A.2d at 972. In its
analysis, the court acknowledged that it had recognized such
claims in cases where an individual was the direct object of a negligent act. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Handler further noted the
court's recognition of such a claim in cases where an individual,
although not the direct object of negligence, witnesses another
person suffer injury due to that negligence. Id., 654 A.2d at 973
(citation omitted). Justice Handler noted that the court first recognized that latter type of indirect claim in Portee v. Jaffee, where
the court granted relief to a mother who watched her son die in a
brutal elevator accident. Id. (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417
A.2d 521 (1980)). Justice Handler emphasized that the Porteecourt
granted relief even though the mother did not herself suffer physical harm and had no fear of becoming injured. Id. The court then
outlined the four prerequisites to a successful cause of action
under the Portee ruling. Id. at 296-97, 654 A.2d at 973. According
to Portee, the justice stated, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress can be sustained if: (1) the defendants caused the
negligence resulting in the death or injury; (2) a family relationship existed between the victim and the plaintiff; (3) the death or
injury was observed by the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff thereby
suffered emotional distress. Id.
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Next, the court acknowledged that emotional distress claims,
both direct and indirect, can arise in the context of medical malpractice. Id. at 297, 654 A.2d at 973. The court noted that medical
malpractice which results in emotional injury claims may involve
obstetrical malpractice during pregnancy where the fetus or newborn is seriously or fatally injured and the parents suffer consequent emotional distress. Id. To illustrate this proposition, the
court cited several pertinent New Jersey Supreme Court cases
where parents prevailed upon claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress resulting from obstetrical malpractice. Id. (citations omitted).
Considering more closely the emotional distress cause of action within the framework of obstetrical malpractice, Justice Handler contemplated the differing characterizations of direct and
indirect injury. Id. The court stressed that when malpractice occurs during pregnancy and results in fetal injury or death, the distinction between direct and indirect distress disappears since the
mother and fetus are one when the malpractice occurs. Id. (citing
Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 59, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993)). Justice Handler articulated that although the fetus is considered the primary
victim in those cases, it does not necessarily follow that the
mother's emotional distress claim should be considered indirect.
Id. at 298, 654 A.2d at 974.
Distinguishing the Gendeks' claim from those in which the
malpractice occurs during pregnancy or childbirth, Justice Handler emphasized that Gregory Gendek died as a result of malpractice that occurred after a normal birth. Id. at 299, 654 A.2d at 974.
Because the alleged malpractice occurred after the birthing process, Justice Handler declared that the Gendek's claim was governed by the standard announced in Frame v. Kothari. Id. at 300,
654 A.2d at 974 (citing Frame v. Kothari, 115 N.J. 638, 643, 560 A.2d
675 (1989)). In Frame, the justice observed, the court rejected a
couple's claim for indirect emotional distress arising from the medical misdiagnosis of their son because the nature of the misdiagnosis was such that its results did not surface immediately and were
not shocking. Id. Recognizing the possibility of a meritorious indirect claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, however,
the Frame court asserted that a claimant could prevail on such a
claim if the claimant observed the malpractice and connected the
malpractice with the victim's injury. Id. at 301, 654 A.2d at 975.
Justice Handier maintained that the Gendeks were not witnesses to
any act of malpractice and that they only viewed non-negligent re-
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suscitative efforts. Id. Furthermore, the court found that, under
the Frame standard, the Gendeks did not immediately connect
Gregory's condition with any act of malpractice. Id. at 301-02, 654
A.2d at 975.
In rejecting the emotional distress cause of action, the court
sternly insisted on the presence of immediate, close, and clear involvement between the distressed claimant and the conduct of the
health care providers whose actions of malpractice resulted in the
injuries to a related loved one. Id. at 302, 654 A.2d at 976. Concluding, the court asserted that such a degree of involvement and
connection was absent in the Gendeks' case. Id.
Dissenting, Justice Stein refuted the majority's holding that
Mrs. Gendek's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
was barred because she did not notice and was not aware of the
malpractice that resulted in her son's death. Id. at 303, 654 A.2d at
976 (Stein, J., dissenting). Believing that the majority overstated
the Frameholding, Justice Stein asserted that the majority decision
created an unwarranted exclusion from the narrow category of
cases recognizing emotional distress claims. Id. at 304, 654 A.2d at
976. After reviewing a number of malpractice cases, Justice Stein
concluded that the court's holding in Frame should not be considered to impose a requirement that the bystander witness the act of
malpractice in all cases. Id. at 307, 654 A.2d at 978 (Stein, J., dissenting). Like the majority, Justice Stein recognized that the Frame
opinion modified the Portee framework by permitting a family
member bystander to recover damages for emotional distress if he
or she observed the medical personnel's malpractice, witnessed the
effect on the patient, and immediately connected that malpractice
to the injury. Id. at 308, 654 A.2d at 979. In Justice Stein's view,
this modification of Portee should be viewed as an exception, not a
substitute, for the Portee guidelines, so that the observation of the
injury or death, and not the malpractice itself, supports recovery
when such observation qualifies as an emotional event. Id. at 30809, 654 A.2d at 979 (Stein, J., dissenting).
To illustrate this point, Justice Stein asserted that Mrs.
Gendek's lack of awareness of the hospital's deviation from medical standards was insignificant in light of what she witnessed when
the medical team performed emergency resuscitation procedures
on Gregory. Id. at 309, 654 A.2d at 979. Justice Stein therefore
advised the majority that a family member's action for emotional
distress arising out of medical malpractice that satisfies the Portee
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standards should prevail even if the plaintiff was not simultaneously
aware of the malpractice. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court bravely limited tort liability in
New Jersey by strictly applying a well-developed standard. In considering the standards applicable to an indirect claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress stemming from medical malpractice, the court was mindful of public policy and correctly insisted
that the contact between a victim of emotional distress and the actions of health care providers be immediate, close, and clear.
Although, as the court well noted, the Gendeks' loss was real and
tragic, a line needed to be drawn to limit unfairness and to restrict
liability. The requirement that the claimant observe and be conscious of the medical malpractice imposes a sound and fair hurdle
to recovery.
Colleen Tracy

TORTS-DEFAMATION-NEGLIGENCE

IS THE APPROPRIATE

STAN-

DARD OF PROOF IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS INVOLVING BUSINESSES
THAT ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY REGULATED WHEN THE RE-

PORTED ACTrrVIEs Do NOT IMPLICATE QUESTIONS OF SAFETY OR
PUBLIC HEALTH AND COULD NOT BE DEEMED CONSUMER
FRAUD-Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp.,

No. A-27, 1995 WL 121529 (N.J. March 15, 1995).
In August of 1988, the defendant newspaper, Bergen Record
Corporation (The Record), published an investigative report and an
accompanying article alleging that the plaintiff, Turf Lawnmower
Repair, Inc. (Turf), was taking advantage of its customers. Id. at *1.
The lead article claimed that Turf's owner, John L. Gloria, another
plaintiff in this action, was "fiercely ambitious." The Record further
stated that Turf had consistently overcharged its customers for services that often remained unperformed, and that when The Record
sent reporters to Turf to have mowers in need of simple repairs
fixed, Turf either performed or recommended unnecessary work.
Quoting Turf's customers and former employees, the article
continued by attacking the allegedly rude demeanor of Gloria and

his staff. The report provided examples of how Turf "ripped-off'
its customers by instructing employees to insert worn parts rather
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than new lawnmower components. The article recounted the story
of Mel Clansky, a Turf customer, who paid to have his mower fixed;
yet, upon returning home the mower did not work. Id. at *2. Clansky took the mower back to Turf to be repaired. While waiting for
his old lawnmower, Clansky purchased a new mower for $150.
When a Turf employee called Clansky to tell him it would cost $200
to repair the mower, Clansky requested that his old machine be
returned. Turf, however, was unable to locate Clansky's lawnmower, and Clansky's lawnmower was never returned.
The article also described some tests that The Record performed. Id. at *2-3, *16. In one test, The Record reporters loosened
both the on/off switch and a spark plug of a newly-repaired mower
and brought it to Turf for repairs. Id. at *16. Allegedly, a Turf
employee immediately identified the problem, but advised the reporter to leave the machine with the shop for examination. The
employee explained that there would be a twenty dollar diagnostic
fee. When the reporter came to pick up the mower, Turf asserted
that the mower needed a tune-up and needed its blades
sharpened.
The ancillary article detailed a test that The Record used to assess the integrity of twelve lawnmower repair shops. Id. at *3. The
Record loosened the spark plugs of a working lawnmower and then
sent reporters to repair shops asking the shops to fix the problem.
The sub-article discussed The Record's experience with Turf. Turf
told the reporter that it was likely the mower needed a tuneup. A
month later, when the work on the mower was completed, Turf
charged the reporter $63. A Turf employee told the reporter that
he installed new points and rebuilt the mower's carburetor. Id. at
*17.

In January of 1989, Gloria filed a complaint against The Bergen Record Corporation, the publishing corporation of the newspapers that contained the articles; the editor of the newspaper; the
publisher; the Investigative News Editor who was also the author of
the lead article; and an investigative researcher. Id. at *3. The
three-count complaint alleged libel, based on the defendants' alleged malicious publication of an article about the plaintiffs; slander, based on the allegation that Turf's former employees provided
the defendants with false and malicious statements in order to injure the plaintiff's reputation; and intentional interference with
prospective business advantage, based on Turfs loss of income and
potential customers and Gloria's embarrassment, mental anxiety,
and distress resulting from the defendant's and former Turf em-
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ployees' tortious conduct. Id. Later, in August of 1990, the plaintiffs filed another complaint against the competitor cited in The
Record article, alleging that the competitor cooperated with The Record in an effort to destroy Turfs business. Id. All of plaintiff's
claims against former Turf employees were subsequently dismissed
by consent. Id.
The defendants and the competitor named in Turf's second
complaint moved for summary judgment after lengthy discovery.
Id. at *4. Interpreting all contradictory facts in the plaintiff's favor,
the trial court granted The Record's motion, holding that despite
The Record's unfair tests and biased reporting, summary judgment
was appropriate because the plaintiff had not established that The
Record knew the falsity of the reports. Id. The trial court predicated the holding on the plaintiffs inability to establish proof of
actual malice after determining that actual malice was the appropriate standard. Id.
Affirming the trial court, a majority of the appellate division
concluded that lawn mower sales and repairs constituted an activity
that is a matter of legitimate public concern. Id. (citing TurfLawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 269 N.J. Super. 370, 376
(App. Div. 1994)). Because the plaintiff conceded that the actual
malice standard was applicable, the concurring judge agreed with
the majority's result without determining whether lawn mower repairs and sales were activities constituting a legitimate public interest. Id. (citing Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc., 269 N.J. Super. at 380
(Wefing, J., concurring)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Turfs petition for
certification. Id. (citing Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record
Corp., 136 N.J. 30 (1994)). Affirming the appellate division's award
of summary judgment to the defendants, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the negligence standard of proof applies in defamation actions when the reported practices do not implicate issues
of health and safety nor constitute consumer fraud violations, and
the businesses implicated are not highly regulated and are involved
in everyday activities. Id. at *19, *20.
Justice Garibaldi, author of the majority opinion, began by addressing whether the appropriate standard for assessing liability in
defamation suits involving business activities reported in newspapers was actual malice. Id. at *4. Rejecting the use of actual malice
as the standard, Justice Garibaldi explained that public policy considerations compelled the court not to impose such a high standard on all businesses. Id. at *5. The justice observed that in
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balancing the interests of an uninhibited, free press vis-a-vis the interests of protecting the reputation of businesses and their owners,
the public interest would be better served by protecting businesses,
because even if the high standard of actual malice was inapplicable, the press would not be deterred in publishing reports. Id.
Exploring the standards applied in different statesJustice Garibaldi articulated that most state defamation laws imposed a low
standard of proof when dealing with private individuals, requiring
that the plaintiff only show that he or she was subjected to "hatred,
contempt, or ridicule," because of a false publication. Id. (citing
Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)). The majority reminded that the United States Supreme
Court had limited state defamation laws by establishing that the
standard for public officials seeking to recover in defamation suits
would be the actual malice standard. Id. (citing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). The court next mentioned
the United States Supreme Court's extension of the actual malice
standard to public figures, and the ability of defendants who reported about private citizens, either made famous because of the
role they played in shaping events of concern to the public or involved with resolving important public questions, to be shielded by
the actual malice standard. Id. (citing Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)). Thus, the
court noted the birth of "public concern" in analyzing First
Amendment cases. Id.
The majority continued by reminding that in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., the United States Supreme Court once again broadened the sphere in which the actual malice standard applied,
holding that the standard was applicable in libel actions provided
that the defamatory statement related to issues of public interest.
Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)). Justice Garibaldi noted, however, that in Gertz, the United States
Supreme Court repudiated its extension of the actual malice standard's applicability, explaining that private individuals were entitled to heightened protection because they did not have the same
broad access to the media that was available to public figures;
therefore, they could not counteract false statements. Id. (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45). Furthermore, the justice recalled the
Gertz Court's reasoning that because private individuals do not affirmatively thrust themselves into the public arena to influence
controversial public issues, they should be afforded with additional
protection. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 346). Justice Gari-
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baldi stressed that despite the Gertz holding, which did not subject
private individuals to the high actual malice standard regardless of
whether they were involved in an area of legitimate public concern,
the United States Supreme Court's ruling allowed individual states
to determine the applicable standard in defamation suits involving
private plaintiffs. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347).
The majority next detailed the safeguards the Gertz Court provided for the press. Id. at *6. First, Justice Garibaldi noted that
absent a showing of fault, states could not impose liability on the
press. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347). Second, the majority observed, the United States Supreme Court established that states
could not permit assessing punitive or presumed damages against
the press unless a plaintiff established that the press acted with actual malice. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349). Justice Garibaldi
further set forth the United States Supreme Court's requirements
that private plaintiffs be shouldered with the burden of proof regarding both the falsity of the defendant's statements and the establishment of the defendant's fault. Id. (citing Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1987)). The majority
emphasized that the United States Supreme Court recognized that
there were sufficient constitutional protections in effect, and therefore, no additional safeguards were necessary for media initiated
defamatory statements. Id. (citing Milkovich v. LorainJ. Co., 497
U.S. 1, 17, 19 (1990) (quotations omitted)).
The majority continued by pointing out that, regardless of
whether the reported subject matter centered on issues of public
concern, forty-two states have adopted a negligence standard of
proof for private plaintiffs in defamation actions against media defendants. Id. Justice Garibaldi explained that such a trend supported the majority's determination that failure to apply the actual
malice standard in all business defamation suits would not create a
chilling effect. Id. The justice also noted that neither party had
presented any evidence establishing that the application of a negligence standard of review to defamation suits brought by private
plaintiffs would deter the publication of information. Id.
Using the California case of Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Company as an example of a decision imposing a negligence standard
of proof in defamation actions initiated by private plaintiffs, the
majority examined the California Supreme Court's rationale for
adopting the less stringent standard of proof. See id. at *6-*7 (citing Brown v. Kelly BroadcastingCo., 771 P.2d 406, 435 (Cal. 1989)).
Justice Garibaldi listed seven public policy justifications for Califor-
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nia's holding that a television station that reported consumer affairs issues was not entitled to a broad privilege when criticizing a
local home contractor. Id. at *6-*7 (citing Brown, 771 P.2d at 413,
423, 425, 428-29, 430, 431, 435).
TheJustice articulated the California Supreme Court's reasoning that if activities implicating a public interest were judged by the
actual malice standard, regardless of the plaintiffs status as a private or public person, the media's privilege would be too broad.
Id. at *7 (citing Brown, 771 P.2d at 413, 423). Furthermore, Justice
Garibaldi explained that the Brown court wanted to afford California citizens the same level of protection urged by the Restatement
of Torts and afforded to people in other states. Id. (citing Brown,
771 P.2d at 425 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B
(1989))). Noting the importance California attributed to a private
individual's reputation, the majority explained that the Brown
Court recognized that a defamation suit may be a private citizen's
only remedy against the more powerful and pervasive media, which
occasionally overstep the permissible boundaries. Id. (citing
Brown, 771 P.2d at 425 (quotation omitted)). The court also examined California's additional rationales for the Brown decision
based on the already existing constitutional protections of the
press, the fact that so long as the press acted reasonably its reports
would be protected by a negligence standard, the fact that the California defendant could not establish that the media in states that
adopted negligence as a standard of proof had been restricted in
their reporting, and the fact that the media could always correct
errors made in the course of their reports. Id. (citing Brown, 771
P.2d at 428-29, 430, 431).
Declaring that New Jersey is one of only three states to use the
actual malice standard in defamation suits initiated by private individuals, Justice Garibaldi indicated that commentators explained
that the adherence to this standard reflects a compliance with the
United States Supreme Court's Rosenbloom rationale. Id. (citing
RONALD SMOLI.A, LAW OF DEFAMATION, 3-28 (1988)). Rosenbloom's
reasoning, the majority remarked, was no longer applicable, as the
United States Supreme Court had repudiated the decision in Gertz.
Id. Moreover, Justice Garibaldi remarked, in those states still applying actual malice in private plaintiff actions, federal courts have
questioned the states' reasoning, but were forced to apply the standard because the states refused to disapprove of it. Id. at *7-*8
(citations omitted).
Recognizing that New Jersey defamation decisions are repre-
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sentative of the tensions addressed in state and federal cases
around the country, the justice identified the competing interests
of fostering a free and uninhibited press versus protecting an individual's freedom to enjoy his or her reputation free from untrue
defamatory attacks. Id. at *8 (citations omitted). The justice
pointed out that New Jersey adopted the United States Supreme
Court's classifications of plaintiffs as public and private figures, recognizing that those who have taken on a public role can more
fairly be mandated to establish a heavier standard of proof in defamation actions. Id. (citing Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J.
594, 612-14 (1994); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 265, 269-70
(1986)).
Furthermore, Justice Garibaldi acknowledged that New Jersey
once again followed the United States Supreme Court's lead by
classifying the type of speech implicated in defamation suits and
providing greater protection to speech implicating public concern.
Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758-59 (1985)). The majority stated that after the United
States Supreme Court's New York Times decision, to encourage an
uninhibited, robust press, the New Jersey Supreme Court afforded
greater protection to reports dealing with issues of public concern,
while finding that issues unrelated to the public welfare were not as
worthy of implicating the heightened standard. Id. (citing Sisler,
104 NJ. at 266; Kotikoffv. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 73 (1982)
(quotation omitted)).
The majority continued, explaining that in Sisler v. Gannett Co.
and Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel PublishingCo., the court articulated a
test that provided greater protection to speech centering on a
highly regulated industry or an issue of public health and safety.
Id. at *9 (citing Sisler, 104 N.J. at 279; Daiy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel
Publishing Co., 104 NJ. 125, 141-46 (1986)). The majority emphasized, however, that these decisions could not be interpreted as imposing a higher standard of proof in all cases involving consumer
investigative reports. Id. The majority noted that some courts established a test for determining whether activities or products implicated matters of public concern. Id. In so doing, the majority
listed matters dealing with necessities of life, such as food and
water, pervasive effects of products, and imposition of substantial
governmental regulations as indicia of issues of public interest. Id.
(citing Dairy Stores, Inc., 104 N.J. at 144-45 (citations omitted)).
Stressing that the Dairy Stores case involved the sale of bottled
water, which implicated a health concern, and that the Sisler case
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involved banking, a heavily regulated industry, Justice Garibaldi
pronounced that the court would still use the actual malice standard in defamation actions implicating business activities inherently involving matters of public concern. Id. at *10. The justice
further proclaimed that the actual malice standard was inappropriate when dealing with businesses that involve routine services or
sales of everyday products, such as lawnmower repair, and thus do
not involve matters of legitimate public interest. Id.
The majority concluded that private plaintiffs were those who
failed to assume a position in the public spotlight and who were
unable to respond to criticism in the press. Id. Finding that most
ordinary businesses and business owners were like private individuals, the court announced that less stringent defamation rules governing private citizens would be equally applicable to them. Id.
Justice Garibaldi related that despite the importance of these businesses to many communities, their activities do not constitute public matters as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, nor
are the their owners "public figures," thereby implicating the actual malice standard. Id. The justice further explained that limited business advertising is not enough to categorize a business as
assuming a position in the public spotlight. Id.
These ordinary businesses, the court furthered, do not have
the financial ability nor the connections through which they can
effectively counteract false press statements and protect themselves. Id. at *11 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344). Thus, the court
held that the application of the negligence standard in these contexts best serves the dual interests of maintaining a free and uninhibited press while protecting a private person or business's good
name and reputation. Id.
The court next distinguished businesses allegedly involved
with consumer fraud, criminal fraud, or a significant regulatory violation. See id. Justice Garibaldi commented that the public has a
legitimate interest in finding out about possible infractions as they
raise issues of public concern. Id. The court therefore held that
when the media reported stories dealing with such matters, the actual malice standard would apply irrespective of the nature of the
business called into question. Id. The Court suggested that this
would effectuate a proper balance between one's right to privacy
and the public's right to be informed of dangers in society. Id.
Applying these findings to the case at hand, the court submitted that the negligence standard normally would apply to plaintiffs
involved in lawn mower sales and repairs, because these businesses
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are not heavily regulated nor do they implicate issues that are "essentials of life." Id. The court stated that unless The Record reported facts constituting consumer fraud, which would be of public
interest, the negligence standard applied. Id.
The court continued by examining the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act (the Act), and explained that the legislature amended
the statute on numerous occasions to ensure that the public was
afforded more protection in New Jersey than anywhere else in the
country. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 56:8-1 - 56:8-48; Cox v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994) (quotation omitted)). The
Act, the court maintained, was intended to combat all business activities that constituted unlawful practices. Id. Although the Act
does not define what corresponds to an "unconscionable commercial practice," the court reminded that the phrase has been interpreted as requiring the observance of honesty in fact, good faith,
and fair dealing. Id. at *12 (citing Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales,
Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 472 (1988) (quotation omitted)).
Explaining that breaches of the Act involved either regulation
violations, affirmative actions, or knowing omissions, the court
noted that the prime ingredient in all three types of consumer
fraud is the ability to mislead. Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17). Continuing to analyze consumer fraud under the Act, the court looked
to two New Jersey cases where business owners charged their customers substantially more than the agreed upon price. Id. (citing
Levin v. Lewis, 179 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 1981); Hyland v.
Zuback, 146 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1976)). The majority
proclaimed that because the business practices in the discussed
cases amounted to consumer fraud, had the media publicized
them, the actual malice standard would have been applied. Id. at
*13.

The court next addressed what constituted consumer fraud, to
determine whether the actual malice standard would be implicated. See id. Rejecting a definition of consumer fraud that would
depend on the media's investigation of the alleged business activities, Justice Garibaldi proclaimed that the definition of consumer
fraud in this context depended on whether the reported activities
comprised a claim under the Act. Id. The justice determined that
in order to trigger the actual malice standard of proof, the article
should be examined in its entirety to ensure that the focus of the
article was consumer fraud violations. Id. If substantially all of the
allegations reported could support an action for consumer fraud,
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the court stated, then the actual malice standard was appropriate.
Id.
Moreover, the majority explained that the alleged activities
had to constitute egregious business practices before rising to the
level of consumer fraud violations. Id. The court suggested referring to the Act and case law to assess whether the activities could be
deemed consumer fraud. Id. Distinguishing between instances
that simply constituted cases of customer dissatisfaction or practices amounting to mere puffery from those that could be classified
as consumer fraud violations, the court reminded that negligence
would be the appropriate standard where business activities that
did not amount to consumer fraud were called into question. Id.
Articulating the test for whether the actual malice standard
applied, the court announced that the actual malice standard was
appropriate when, after making normal and reasonable inferences,
the article described activities that would lead the average reader
to surmise that a business was involved in acts that were misleading,
deceptive, unconscionable, or taken in bad faith. Id. The majority
noted that in making fair inferences, they would consider evidence
provided by the plaintiff to show that the reported activities did not
amount to consumer fraud violations under the Act. Id. at *14.
In determining whether the alleged activities constitute consumer fraud, the court refused to examine the reporters' conduct.
Id. Rather, the court expressed that judicial review would be similar to that undertaken in the past by both the NewJersey Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court, which looked to the
conduct of the plaintiff in assessing whether the actual malice standard was applicable. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone,424 U.S. 448
(1976); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45; Sisler, 104 NJ. at 268-70). The
court reiterated that if the alleged business activities would not violate the Act, then they would not be matters of legitimate public
concern implicating the actual malice standard. Id.
The court also noted that in evaluating whether the reported
activities were consumer fraud violations, the court could look to
the sources of the allegations. Id. at *15. The majority proclaimed
that if an article's sources were solely comprised of former fired or
disgruntled employees, or one of the business's primary competitors, then a court could find that such evidence on its own would
be insufficient in establishing that the plaintiffs actions violated
the Act. Id.
The court next examined the activities discussed in The Record's articles to determine whether they could amount to consumer
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fraud. Id. at *14. The majority determined that the portion of The
Records article based on the accounts of two customers, who alleged that those employed by Turf were rude and had brought
suits against Turf only to have their claims dismissed, could not be
deemed consumer fraud violations prohibited by the Act. Id. The
court also rejected the premise that Turfs "sloppy business practices," as discussed in the article, amounted to consumer fraud. Id.
at *15. The court, however, found that The Records account of
Turfs actions with respect to Mel Clansky would sustain a consumer fraud claim. Id.
After examining some of the sources for the article's allegations, which included former Turf employees who had been fired,
the majority emphatically stated that The Records failure to disclose
that the interviewed employees were fired casted doubt on whether
the activities constituted consumer fraud. Id. Similarly, the court
opined that The Records presentation of statements made by a Turf
competitor did not support the article's broad assertions, and
therefore, standing alone, could not support activities constituting
Act violations. Id. at *16. Justice Garibaldi pointed out that the
competitor's statements, nevertheless, bolstered evidence of Turfs
alleged consumer fraud. Id. at *16.
Assessing that results from some tests conducted by The Record
were sufficient to constitute Act violations, the court posited that
the activities could lead the average person to deduce that Turfs
practices were deceptive, unconscionable, misleading, and replete
with bad faith. Id. Justice Garibaldi cited Turfs conduct with respect to the loosened spark plug tests as examples of actions constituting consumer fraud prohibited by the Act. See id. at *16-*17.
Without deciding whether the record established consumer
fraud, thus supporting a summary judgment motion, the majority
declared that some of the tests The Record performed, coupled with
Clansky's complaint, sufficiently evidenced conduct that would sustain a consumer fraud complaint. Id. at 17. Additionally, the court
submitted that the interviews with Turfs former employees and
competitors were corroborative evidence of Turfs misleading business practices. Id. In holding that the appropriate standard of
proof for summary judgment was actual malice because the articles
established a basis for consumer fraud, the majority further noted
the fact that the author of the lead article tried to contact Gloria
for verification purposes. Id.
The court proceeded by examining whether summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. Id. The majority
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enunciated that the appropriate inquiry was whether the plaintiff
had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants
printed information knowing it was false or with reckless disregard
of the information's veracity. Id. (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at
279-80). Explaining that the plaintiff has a heavy burden in establishing actual malice, the court also reminded that in a summary
judgment motion the facts would be interpreted in the plaintiffs
favor. Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, the majority accepted
Turf's experts' criticisms of the objectivity of the articles and the
methods employed by The Record, both in performing and reporting about the tests The Record conducted. Id. at *17-*18.
Despite consideration of the plaintiff's experts' assertions, the
majority nevertheless found that Turf failed to prove that the author of the lead article doubted Turf's actions amounted to consumer fraud. Id. at *18. Thus, the court concluded that the
plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant's actions manifested
actual malice. Id.
The majority justified its holding that negligence is the appropriate standard for defamation cases brought by businesses involved in everyday services and sales, which are not involved in
practices constituting consumer fraud, activities that center on the
health or welfare of the public, or a substantially regulated industry, by stressing that there was no evidence indicating a restricted
press in any of the states already imposing a negligence standard.
Id. at *19. The majority commented that by imposing the actual
malice standard in cases involving questions of consumer fraud regardless of the business' status, New Jersey was affording the press
with broad protection to further the public's interests. Id.
Stating that the court could not foresee every situation where
broad press protection was appropriate, Justice Garibaldi addressed the concurring opinion's concern that the court was limiting the applicability of the actual malice standard. Id. Justice
Garibaldi explained that the court did not intend to foreclose the
applicability of the actual malice standard in cases where activities
were very damaging to the public. Id. The justice noted that the
court's holding should be interpreted as imparting the message
that when activities reported constitute violations of the Act the
actual malice standard will apply. Id.
Recognizing the difficulties that this holding imposes on businesses, the court conceded that as a result of publication of articles, not only are reputations tarnished, but businesses themselves
may be destroyed. Id. at *20. Because of the importance of a free
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press to disseminate information about consumer fraud, and because of the press' key role in providing consumers with vital information, the majority directed that the actual malice standard apply
to issues constituting consumer fraud. Id. Accordingly, the court
upheld the appellate decision's affirmance of summary judgment
in favor of The Record. Id.
In a separate opinion, Justice Pollock, joined by Justice
O'Hern, criticized the majority's determination that generally, in
order to implicate the actual malice standard, the media must report facts constituting consumer fraud under the Act. Id. at * 20
(Pollock, J., concurring). Agreeing with the court's affirmance of
summary judgment for the defendants, Justice Pollock indicated
disapproval with the majority's reasoning. Id. Justices Pollock and
O'Hern disagreed with the majority's distinctions between
overcharging or provision of inferior services and activities manifesting bad faith, deceit, or unconscionability. Id.
The concurring justices feared that as a result of the Turf
Lawnmower Repair decision, the media would feel constrained when
reporting issues of public concern. Id. at *21 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justices expressed doubt that the media could fulfill its
obligations of disseminating important public information if broad
protection only shielded them when reporting on issues encompassed in the Act. Id.
Additionally, the justices disagreed with the court's sympathy
repair
people. Id. The concurrence noted that customers who
for
must resort to repair people for help need more protection than
businesses. Id. Justice Pollock remarked that the public interest
would be better served by providing broad latitude to the media
who serve the public interest by warning consumers. Id. (citations
omitted). The justices urged that consumers should be afforded
protection by broad dissemination of information regardless of
whether the reported activities fall squarely within the Act. Id.
In closing, Justice Pollock expressed disapproval with the
court's heavy reliance on federal cases and federal constitutional
principles. Id. The concurrence disapproved of the majority's use
of the actual malice standard, which is absent from the common
law definition of defamation. Id. at *21-*22 (Pollock, J., concurring). In fact, Justice Pollock noted that the Restatement refused
to adopt the actual malice term, instead favoring an examination
into whether the media abused its privilege. Id. at *22 (Pollock, J.,
concurring). Adhering to the same principles espoused by the
court's standard, that to overcome the media's qualified privilege
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the plaintiff must demonstrate that the publisher knowingly
printed false information or acted recklessly in establishing the
truth or falsity of the allegations, Justice Pollock simply desired that
the court discard the actual malice label. Id. The concurringjustices advocated that the examination center on a balancing test,
weighing the public's interest in access to information versus the
individual's interest in protection of his or her reputation. Id. (citing Dairy Stores Inc., 104 NJ. at 151 (citations omitted)).
The practical significance of the court's application of the
negligence standard of proof in a defamation case is questionable.
The Turf majority indicated that allegations constituting violations
of the Act implicate the actual malice standard, however, the majority expressly refused to close the door to the standard's applicability when "practices are so damaging to the public as to call for
the protection of the press through a malice standard." Id. at *19.
Thus, it appears that the actual malice standard would be applicable whenever reported practices significantly threaten the public,
and the negligence standard would apply on those occasions when
the activities alleged amount to "mere puffery," charging substantially more than competitors, or disagreements between customers
and businesses. See id. at *13.
In order for a private business' reputation to be shielded by
the negligence standard, the plaintiff will have the burden of demonstrating that, based on the media's allegation, the business cannot be guilty of consumer fraud and the activities they allegedly
engaged in do not significantly damage the public. One wonders,
however, if the press would report on insignificant consumer business controversies, isolated incidents constituting imprudent activities, or the fact that some businesses consistently charge more than
others. These matters indicate that a business may be mismanaged
or unethical, but they do not further the press' goal of informing
the public of dangers, nor will they increase a newspaper's sales.
Although the majority adopted the reasoning and rationales espoused by many jurisdictions that use the negligence standard in
private plaintiff cases, the Turf court failed to encourage the standard's applicability by shielding allegations of consumer fraud enveloped by the Act. See id. at *6, *14.
In conclusion, the Turf court found that in a private plaintiff
defamation action the actual malice standard applied when a newspaper alleged facts that could sustain a consumer fraud violation,
even when a newspaper's sources were questionable and its testing
methods less than scientific. Based on this decision, and given that
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the media have independent reasons for reporting incidents that
will have a significant effect on the public interest, as well as the
breadth of the Act, it is hard to imagine a situation implicating the
negligence standard where the integrity of the media would not be
called into question by the public themselves, thereby obviating resort to a defamation action. One must look to future defamation
cases to see whether the Turf Lawnmower Repair decision, which
purports to extend greater protection to private plaintiffs, will have
any bite at all.
Jennifer G. Schecter

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DESIGN DEFECT-SECTION 3A(2) OF THE
NEW JERSEY PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT OF 1987 PROVIDES AN ABSOLUTE AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO MANUFACTURERS

IF THE

AVOIDANCE OF THE DANGER NECESSITATES THE ELIMINATION OF
AN INHERENT CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRODUCT, THEREBY SIG-

USE-Roberts v. Rich
Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 354, 654 A.2d 1365 (1995).
NIFICANTLY

DIMINISHING ITS

INTENDED

On August 27, 1987, a tractor-trailer truck, owned by Rich
Foods, Inc., and driven by William Lovette, collided into a car
driven by plaintiff Anita Roberts. Id. at 370, 654 A.2d at 1367. As a
result of the accident, Anita became a paraplegic, while her husband, John Roberts, and two children were injured.
A number of hours after the collision, Lovette reported to the
police that he had entered into the construction zone driving sixtyfive miles an hour, twenty miles an hour faster than the posted
speed limit. Lovette also admitted that he had been entering data
into an on-board X-300 computer manufactured by Cadec Systems,
Inc. (Cadec), when he entered the construction area. Trucking
companies must pay taxes dependent upon fuel and road mileage
in each state. The X-300, Cadec's top model on-board computer,
provides a record of that information.
After a series of complaints, cross-claims, and third-party complaints, John and Anita Roberts amended their pleadings, and
commenced a product liability suit against Cadec for the defective
design, manufacture, and labeling of the X-300 computer. At trial,
the sole issue was whether Cadec had defectively designed the X-
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300 because it allowed the computer to be operated while a truck
was moving, thereby increasing the risk that a driver's attention
would be diverted from navigation.
The former Chairman of Cadec testified that the X-300 was
designed to be operable while a vehicle was in motion so that a
driver could record data with increased accuracy while crossing
state lines or when exiting or entering toll roads. Id. at 371, 654
A.2d at 1368. A deposition of a Cadec program analyst was also
introduced to show that the data-recording procedure required
over ten seconds to complete. According to the deposition and
other evidence admitted at trial, the data entry did not have to be
completed at one time and was meant to be operated when, in the
driver's discretion, it was safe to record the information. Cadec
admitted that it could have designed the computer to accept data
only when the truck was stationary.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, instructed the
jury that the plaintiffs carried the burden of proving that the X-300
was defective, and directed the jury to use a risk-utility analysis. Id.
at 372, 654 A.2d at 1368. Despite the plaintiffs' objections, the trial
court also informed the jury of the absolute affirmative defense incorporated in section 3a(2) of the New Jersey Products Liability
Act of 1987, which provides that a defendant is not liable for design defect if "'the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the
product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and that
would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes
the product."' Id. at 370, 372, 654 A.2d at 1367, 1368 (quoting
NJ.S.A. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987)). The court, however, failed
to instruct the jury on the two statutory exceptions to the defense.
Id. at 373, 654 A.2d at 1369. The jury concluded that Cadec had
not defectively designed the computer. Id.
Anita Roberts appealed, and the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. The appellate court acknowledged that the two possible exceptions within section 3a(2)
prohibited the use of the affirmative defense. Id. The court asserted that the affirmative defense in that section is not available
when the product is 1) "industrial machinery or other equipment
[that] is used in the workplace," or 2) when the danger "can feasibly be eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product."
Id. (quoting N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-3a(2)). The appellate court held
that because Cadec conceded that it could have eliminated the
danger, the second exception applied as a matter of law, and the
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trial court had therefore erred in not informing the jury of the
second statutory exception. Id. (quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Cadec's petition
for certification, limiting the scope of its review to the interpretation of the words "'without impairing the usefulness of the product'" as stated in the second exception to the affirmative defense
provided in section 3a(2). Id. at 370, 372, 654 A.2d at 1367, 1368
(quoting NJ.S.A. § 2A:58C-3a(2)). The court held that the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the second exception precludes a defendant's use of the affirmative defense. Id. at 379, 654
A.2d at 1372. The court further clarified when the statutory defense was applicable, and held that the phrase "'impairing the usefulness of the product'" means to significantly diminish the use for
which it was intended. Id. Finally, the court declared that section
3a(2) provides a defense if the avoidance of the danger necessitates the elimination of an inherent characteristic of the product.
Id. at 382, 654 A.2d at 1373 (quoting N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-3a(2)).
Justice Garibaldi, writing for an unanimous court, began the
discussion by observing that the court's primary task in construing
a statute is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Id. at 373-74, 654
A.2d at 1369 (citations omitted). The justice explained that section 3a(2) was part of a comprehensive effort, on the part of the
legislature, to limit the growth of products liability law through the
statutory creation of rebuttable presumptions of non-liability and
absolute defenses in design defect cases. Id. at 374, 654 A.2d at
1369 (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-3a(1), a(2), a(3) (West 1987))
(other citations omitted). Noting that the NewJersey Products Liability Act of 1987 was not meant to codify all products liability issues, Justice Garibaldi asserted that the Act was intended to
establish clear rules and principles in determining liability. Id., 654
A.2d at 1369-70 (quoting NJ.S.A. § 2A:58C-1 (West 1987)).
The court next provided an overview of the common-law rules
governing products liability, and analyzed how the Act modified
and changed those laws. Id. at 376-77, 654 A.2d at 1370-71 (citations omitted). Justice Garibaldi pronounced that section 3a(2)
created a defense based on consumer expectations and the obvious-danger element of the risk-utility analysis. Id. at 377, 654 A.2d
at 1371 (citations omitted). Whereas a common-law plaintiff would
have only considered the obvious-danger/consumer expectations
factors of the risk-utility analysis as two factors among many in proving its prima facie case, Justice Garibaldi posited that the Act converted the obvious-danger/consumer expectations factors into an
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absolute affirmative defense. Id. (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:58C-3a(2))
(other citations omitted). The justice next suggested that, while in
theory the defendant bears the burden of proving the section
3a(2) defense, the absolute defense will invariably be raised in
practice and the plaintiff will be unlikely to succeed in the suit
without disproving it or showing that one of the two exceptions to
the defense should apply. Id. at 377-78, 654 A.2d at 1371-72.
The court then addressed the issue of which party bears the
burden of proving that the exception applies. Id. at 379, 654 A.2d
at 1372. Noting that the legislative history and case law were silent
on this issue, the justice held that the plaintiff must prove that the
exception prohibits the defendant's use of section 3a(2)'s defense.
Id. The justice reasoned that this conclusion conforms to the plain
language of the statute and to the legislature's intent to make it
more difficult for a plaintiff to succeed in a design defect suit. Id.
The result of this holding, the court observed, means that a plaintiff who proves that a defendant could have eliminated a danger
"without impairing the usefulness of the product" may be able to
succeed in a design defect case despite the fact that the defendant
has proved the defense in section 3a(2). Id.
Attempting to clarify the meaning of the phrase "without impairing the usefulness of the product," Justice Garibaldi interpreted the legislative history of the statute to suggest the phrase
implicates the product's inherent characteristics and intended use.
Id. at 380, 654 A.2d at 1372. Therefore, the justice postulated, dangers not considered inherent to the product may be eliminated
without fear of impairing its usefulness. Id., 654 A.2d at 1373. The
court used a hypothetical involving a carving knife to illustrate this
point. Id. Because a sharp blade is essential to the intended use of
a carving knife, and thus an inherent characteristic of it, the justice
asserted that a plaintiff would be unable to establish the section
3a(2) exception by arguing that a dull knife would prove safer. Id.
The court contrasted this scenario with one involving a lawn
mower, where an exposed blade was not inherent to its use, and
where a section 3a(2) exception could be proven by showing that a
manufacturer was able to cover the blades, thereby minimizing the
threat of injury. Id.
The majority also held that "impairing the usefulness of the
product" means to significantly diminish its intended use. Id. at
382, 654 A.2d at 1373. The court further explained that, even if it
was technologically and economically practical to eliminate the
danger, the section 3a(2) defense still applies if this change would
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require the elimination of an inherent characteristic of the product. Id. Justice Garibaldi emphasized, however, that the desirability of a product's feature does not necessarily equate it to an
inherent characteristic. Id. The latter, the justice stressed, is essential to the product if its elimination would measurably reduce the
utility of the product in performing its central function. Id.
Focusing on the case at bar, the court decided that Anita bore
the burden of proving that the X-300 computer was defectively
designed because it was not "'reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its
intended purposes.'" Id., 654 A.2d at 1374 (quoting N.J.S.A.
§ 2A:58C-2) (West 1987)). In turn, the majority declared, Cadec
bore the burden of proving the section 3a(2) defense by showing
that the danger was both open and obvious to the consumer, and
that the injury was caused by a known and inherent characteristic
of the product. Id. If Cadec were successful, the court stated, then
Anita would bear the additional burden of proving that the section
3a(2) defense should not apply because Cadec could have eliminated the risk without impairing the usefulness of the computer.
Id.
Justice Garibaldi determined that the crux of the issue, therefore, was whether or not the X-300's ability to accept data while in
motion was, as Cadec argued, an inherent characteristic of the
computer. Id. at 383, 654 A.2d at 1374. Because the danger of
averting one's eyes from the road is obvious to any driver, the justice opined, the answers to the questions of whether or not the
entering of data while in motion was an inherent characteristic of
the X-300 and whether or not the elimination of this feature in
part or in its entirety would significantly diminish the product's
intended use would determine if the exception to the section 3a(2)
defense applied. Id.
The majority disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion
that Cadec's concession that it could have designed the X-300 to
only accept data when stationary made the product defective as a
matter of law. Id. In contrast, the court suggested, the very same
feature could arguably be considered an inherent characteristic of
the product, the elimination of which would substantially diminish
its intended use. Id. The justice concluded that this was a proper
question for the jury to decide. Id. Likewise, Justice Garibaldi rebutted the trial court for not charging the jury with the exception
to section 3a(2), thereby foreclosing the plaintiff's opportunity to
argue that the in-motion feature was not an inherent characteristic
of the X-300. Id. The court thereupon affirmed the judgment of
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the appeals court, and remanded the case, as modified by the
court's opinion. Id. at 384, 654 A.2d at 1375.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision properly allows a
jury to determine whether or not the virtues of accuracy and convenience are an inherent characteristic of the X-300 computer.
The majority's affirmance, with modification, of the appellate
court will enable both parties to offer proof in support of their
respective positions, thereby allowing thejury to make an informed
judgment. Because this judgment will ultimately rest on the jury's
conclusions about material facts, i.e., the nature of the design and
the necessity of the in-motion feature, the court was correct in deciding that the issue could not be resolved as a matter of law.
The difficulty in clarifying the phrase "without impairing the
usefulness of the product" is, unfortunately, a necessary evil when
dealing with design defect cases. While one may hope for more
specific guidelines in legislation that are aimed at establishing clear
rules in such cases, one of the proper functions of the court has
always been to determine the meaning of the law. Because products are developed and marketed with particular purposes and
qualities in mind, a teleological conception of their virtues and nature, adjudicated by citizens who are both consumers and fact finders, may be the most practical method of determining these issues.
Michael T. Carton

EDUCATION

LAW-ARBITRATION-ARBITRATOR DID NOT EXCEED

HIS AUTHORITY UNDER ARBITRATION PROVISION OF NEGOTIATED
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BY APPLYING "JUST CAUSE" STANDARD
TO DETERMINE THAT LOCAL
WITHHELD

TEACHER'S

BOARD

OF EDUCATION IMPROPERLY

SALARY INCREMENT

FOR DISCIPLINARY

REASONS-Scotch Plains-FanwoodBd. of Educ. v. Scotch PlainsFanwood Educ. Ass'n, 139 N.J. 141, 651 A.2d 1018 (1995).
The Scotch Plains-Fanwood Board of Education (Board) had
employed MaeDelle Horton, a tenured high school Resource
Room teacher, since 1977. Id. at 145, 651 A.2d at 1020. The position necessitated individualized contact on a regular basis between
Horton and her students and their parents and other instructors.
By the end of the 1988-89 school year, however, Horton, over the
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course of her career, had missed 244.5 days of work due to illness.
Id. at 146, 651 A.2d at 1020.
Given Horton's attendance record, the high-school principal
warned Horton in 1985 and again in 1988 that her repeated absences had negatively impacted student learning and thus jeopardized her salary increment for the next school year. Under the
employment agreement negotiated between the Board and the
Scotch Plains-Fanwood Education Association (Association), teachers could anticipate salary increments only upon the approval of
the Superintendent and the Board.
After sustaining injuries in a train accident in September 1989,
Horton recuperated for two months without advising her employer
of her need for a prolonged absence. The district was thus unable
to hire a substitute instructor during Horton's absence. In his November 1989 Interim Evaluation Report on Horton, the principal
reiterated that Horton's absenteeism had denied her students adequate instruction. Id., 651 A.2d at 1020-21. In rebuttal, Horton
explained that her inattendance in 1989 was due to major surgery
in February and the train accident in September. Id., 651 A.2d at
1020, 1021.
Horton cited her excuses once again when the principal
blamed Horton for the ineffectiveness of the Resource Room in his
March 1990 Summary Evaluation Report. Id. at 147, 651 A.2d at
1021. The Board nonetheless voted to withhold Horton's salary
increment for the 1990-91 school year, thus leaving her salary at
the 1989-90 level.
Casting its action as educationally-oriented, the Board rejected
Horton's grievance against the withholding. When the Association
responded by seeking binding arbitration, the Board petitioned
the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC)
for a determination as to whether the conflict was subject to arbitration. Recognizing that statutory law mandates binding arbitration of disciplinary increment withholdings, PERC characterized
the Board's action as disciplinary in nature and thus subject to arbitration. Id. at 147, 651 A.2d at 1021 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 34:13A-26 and -29 and citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-27a).
According to the parties' negotiated agreement, the arbitrator
could review only those issues presented for his consideration and
could not alter the agreement in any way. Id. at 147-48, 651 A.2d at
1021. After holding a hearing, the arbitrator determined that
although the Board had a substantial interest in employee attendance, the Board's withholding of Horton's salary increment must
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be reversed because of its disciplinary character. Id. at 148, 651
A.2d at 1021. By neglecting to evaluate the validity of Horton's
absences, the Board had demonstrated to the arbitrator the lack of
any reasoned basis for the withholding, which the arbitrator found
to be excessive. Id., 651 A.2d at 1021-22.
In overturning the chancery division's confirmation of the
award, the appellate division explained that the arbitrator had
overstepped the bounds of his contractual authority. Id. at 145,
651 A.2d at 1018 (citing Scotch Plains-FanwoodBd. of Educ. v. Scotch
Plains-FanwoodEduc. Ass'n, 270 NJ. Super. 444, 449, 637 A.2d 539

(1994)). The appellate division explained that the arbitrator
lacked the authority to recognize PERC's determination that the
withholding was disciplinary. Id. at 148, 651 A.2d at 1022. In addition, the appellate division objected to the arbitrator's presumption that Horton had a legal right to the increment. Id. at 148-49,
651 A.2d at 1022. Finally, the appellate division interpreted the
arbitrator's decision as compelling the Board to undertake a more
positive form of discipline not contemplated by the parties' contract. Id. at 149, 651 A.2d at 1022.
Upon granting the Association's petition for certification, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate division's decision. Id. at 145, 651 A.2d at 1018 (citing Scotch Plains-FanwoodBd. of

Educ., 137 N.J. 165, 644 A.2d 613 (1994)). The court held that the
arbitrator did not exceed his authority under the arbitration provision of the parties' agreement by applying a "just cause" standard
to determine that the Board had improperly withheld Horton's salary increment for a disciplinary reason. Id. at 158, 651 A.2d at
1026.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stein recognized arbitration as an effective, efficient alternative to litigation for resolving
employment controversies. Id. at 149, 651 A.2d at 1022 (quoting
Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 187, 430

A.2d 214 (1981) (citation omitted)). In addition, the justice
opined that courts should circumscribe their review of arbitration
awards. Id. (citing Local No. 153, Office & ProfessionalEmployees Int'l
Union v. Trust Co. of New Jersey, 105 N.J. 442, 448, 522 A.2d 992

(1987)) (citation omitted). Justice Stein clarified, however, that
courts should not defer to an award rendered by an arbitrator who
breaches the limits of his authority. Id. (citing County College of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 391, 495 A.2d

865 (1985)). The justice cited the terms of the parties' employment agreement as the source of those bounds. Id. (citing Local
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No. 153, 105 N.J. at 449, 522 A.2d at 992; County College of Mois,
100 N.J. at 391, 495 A.2d at 865) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
the court declared that statutory law permitted the vacation of
awards that resulted from an arbitrator's abuse of authority. Id. at
149-50, 651 A.2d at 1022 (citing Communication Workers, Local 1087
v. Monmouth County Bd. of Social Servs., 96 N.J. 442, 448, 476 A.2d
777 (1984)) (citation omitted). To illustrate this point, the justice
cited a state law requiring vacation of an award resulting from an
arbitrator's transgression or maladministration of his authority. Id.
at 150, 651 A.2d at 1022 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-8d).
Next, the justice referred to the rule that arbitrators may not
fashion awards in public sector disputes that contravene existing
statutory authority. Id. (quoting Old Bridge Bd. of Educ. v. Old Bridge
Educ. Ass'n, 98 N.J. 523, 528, 489 A.2d 159 (1985) (quoting Teaneck
Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers' Ass'n, 94 N.J. 9, 15, 462 A.2d 137
(1983)) (citation omitted). In this instance, the court noted that
the appellate division had applied a state law empowering a board
of education to withhold a salary increment for any good cause.
Id., 651 A.2d at 1022-23 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:29-14).
Justice Stein reminded that the court had already discerned
from the statute that a board could withhold an increment upon
adjudging the quality of a teacher's instruction as poor. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Bernards Twsp. Educ. Ass'n, 79 N.J. 311, 321, 399
A.2d 620 (1979)). Therefore, the court observed, the statute had
not afforded teachers an unqualified statutory entitlement to their
salary increments. Id. at 151, 651 A.2d at 1023 (quoting North
PlainfieldEduc. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 96 N.J. 587, 593, 476 A.2d 1245
(1984)). Justice Stein countered that the statute intended teachers
to undergo annual performance reviews and that school boards
have a right to conduct these reviews. Id. (quoting North Plainfield
Educ. Ass'n, 96 N.J. at 587, 476 A.2d at 1245; North Plainfield Educ.
Ass'n, 96 N.J. at 593, 476 A.2d at 1245).
Because the Association proffered that subsequent amendments to the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (the
Act) had instituted a "just cause" standard for disciplinary increment withholding, the court surveyed the history of the Act to elucidate the appropriate standard of review. Id. (citing State v. State
TroopersFraternalAss'n, 134 N.J. 393, 634 A.2d 478 (1993)). Revisiting the Act's origin, Justice Stein discovered that the Act did not
specify those disputes for which it had commanded good faith negotiations. Id. at 151, 152, 651 A.2d at 1023 (quotations omitted).
As a result, the court had decided to distinguish negotiable sub-
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jects from non-negotiable subjects as they arose for adjudication.
Id. at 152, 651 A.2d at 1023 (citation omitted). The justice commented that the court had later reiterated its position that negotiations involved employment terms that were either mandated or
prohibited from negotiation by law. Id., 651 A.2d at 1024 (citing
Ridgefield ParkEduc. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144,

162, 393 A.2d 278 (1978)).
The court then recalled its consideration of the negotiability
of subjecting increment withholding to advisory arbitration. Id. at
152-53, 651 A.2d at 1024 (citing Bernards Twsp. Educ. Ass'n, 79 N.J.

at 318, 399 A.2d at 620). To ascertain the term's negotiability, the
court employed a two-prong test inquiring as to the relationship of
the issue to the work environment and management prerogatives.
Id. at 153, 651 A.2d at 1024 (quoting Bernards Twsp. Educ. Ass'n, 79

N.J. at 320, 399 A.2d at 620) (citation omitted). Categorizing binding arbitration as interfering with managerial prerogatives, the
court nonetheless upheld the negotiability of advisory arbitration.
Id. (quoting Bernards Twsp. Educ. Ass'n, 79 N.J. at 326, 399 A.2d at

620) (emphasis added).
Justice Stein then commented that despite subsequent legislative efforts to amend the law to authorize the negotiability of binding arbitration, the Legislature did not achieve this goal with
respect to disciplinary increment withholding until 1989. Id. at
154, 651 A.2d at 1024-25 (quoting Assembly Labor Committee Statement

to L.1989, c.269 (reprinted at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34A:13A-22)). The
justice acknowledged that the so-called scope-of-negotiations
amendments provided that PERC would decide whether a board
had acted to discipline an employee by withholding an increment.
Id., 651 A.2d at 1025 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-27a). Consequently, notwithstanding the appellate division's decision, and in
light of the Board's failure to appeal, the court affirmed the binding authority of PERC's conclusion that the Board had acted with
disciplinary intent. Id. at 155, 651 A.2d at 1025. Furthermore, Justice Stein instructed, the Board shouldered the burden of proving
the propriety of its disciplinary measure. Id. at 154, 651 A.2d at
1025 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-29).
The justice also observed that the scope-of-negotiations
amendments had expressly exempted increment withholding
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:29-14. Id. at 154-55, 651 A.2d at 1025
(quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-22). Gleaning from this provision a legislative intent to differentiate the standard of review applicable to disciplinary withholdings, the court thus refused to adopt
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the standard utilized for performance-related withholdings. Id. at
155, 651 A.2d at 1025. Therefore, the court concluded that the law
compelled the arbitrator to employ a more demanding standard of
review, one which the scope-of-negotiations amendments failed to
contemplate. Id.
Justice Stein posited that the arbitrator maintained a duty to
appropriate a proper standard of review in the absence of a contractual provision defining such a standard. Id. at 156, 651 A.2d at
1025 (citing Local No. 153, 105 N.J. at 452, 522 A.2d at 992). The
court recounted that the arbitrator had ignored any distinction between the parties' proffered standards because he believed that the
Association's "absence of just cause" standard equated to the
Board's standard of arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action.
Id. at 155-56, 651 A.2d at 1025. Based upon the Board's failure to
investigate Horton's absenteeism, the court explained that the arbitrator had rejected the attempted disciplinary withholding for its
lack of any rational basis. Id. at 156, 651 A.2d at 1025. The court
therefore unanimously affirmed the arbitrator's use of the "just
cause" standard, citing the consistent application of the standard in
the related contexts of collective bargaining and arbitration. Id. at
156, 651 A.2d at 1026 (citations omitted). The court bolstered its
concurrence with the "just cause" standard by reconciling its application with the legislative intent to heighten procedural protections for teachers who face disciplinary withholdings. Id. at 157,
651 A.2d at 1026 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-28).
The justice also agreed with the arbitrator's establishment of
employee culpability as a prerequisite for disciplinary increment
withholding related to absenteeism. Id. at 157, 651 A.2d at 1026
(citing E./ DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Assoc., 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986)).
Given that the PERC ruling compelled the arbitrator to view the
Board's action as disciplinary in nature, the court upheld the arbitrator's use of the "just cause" standard as within the scope of his
statutory authority. Id. at 158, 651 A.2d at 1026. Furthermore, the
court abstained from reviewing the propriety of the arbitrator's
award. Id. (citing Local No. 153, 105 N.J. at 448, 522 A.2d at 992).
Emphasizing that its decision neither touched upon PERC's
determination nor impacted upon performance-oriented withholdings, the court reassured that the Board could have withheld Horton's increment had it substantiated the educational basis for its
decision. Id., 651 A.2d at 1027 (citing Scotch Plains-FanwoodBd. of
Educ., 270 N.J. Super at 450, 637 A.2d at 539). In conclusion, the

1995]

SURVEY

1675

court indicated that the legitimacy of the arbitrator's standard rendered moot the court's consideration of the arbitrator's alternative
finding that the board-imposed penalty was excessive. Id. at 159,
651 A.2d at 1027.
For members elected to, administrators responsible to, and attorneys employed by local school boards, Scotch Plains-FanwoodBd.
of Educ. offers two valuable lessons for the maintenance of academic productivity and fiscal efficiency. Whereas teachers deserve
protection from unfair retributive attacks on their livelihood, education officials must likewise defend the interests of students and
taxpayers in effective education and in deterring abusive employees. Upon receiving evidence of questionable employee conduct,
administrators must document those actions as the first line of defense to countercharges of unjustified disciplinary retaliation by
board members. District policy manuals should instruct administrators to maintain detailed observations of and communications
with staff members where circumstances warrant. Although state
law entrusts the creation of district policy with board members,
these civic-minded citizens often lack the legal expertise to appreciate the fundamental role that a well-developed evidentiary record
plays in achieving necessary and successful disciplinary action.
Consequently, school board attorneys must advise their clients to
implement defensive management policies and maintain close contact throughout the decision-making process leading to disciplinary action. As the arbitrator concluded and the court agreed, the
Board failed to substantiate its decision to withhold Horton's increment because its administrators neither investigated nor questioned the propriety of her absenteeism.
Defensive practice demands even earlier interaction between
board attorney and board member when the latter engages in the
often contentious task of contract negotiation. Through its examination of legislative intent, the Scotch Plains-FanwoodBd. of Educ.

court balanced the need for employee protection with respect for
employer prerogative, and appropriately validated the arbitrator's
fault-based analysis. In so doing, the court determined that a
stricter standard pertained than that applied to performance-oriented withholdings, but characterized the "just cause" standard as
appropriate in the absence of a standard of review mutually agreed
upon by the negotiating parties. Thus, board attorneys should advise their clients of the necessity of good faith negotiation of an
express standard of review for disciplinary actions in order to preserve the fullest possible scope of management authority. Antici-
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paring the difficulties attendant to sparse documentation and lax
negotiation in the disciplinary increment withholding context
thereby maximizes district productivity and efficiency for the benefit of all.
CraigA. Ollenschleger

